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Abstract:
Latin America is the most unequal region in the world and there is a lively debate
concerning the explanations and timing of such high levels of income inequality. Latin
America was also the region, not including European Offshoots, which experienced the
most rapid growth during the first globalization boom. It can, therefore, be taken as an
interesting case study for how globalization forces impinged on growth and income
distribution in peripheral regions. This paper presents a first estimate of income
inequality in the Southern Cone of South America (Brazil 1872 and 1920, Chile 1870
and 1920, Uruguay 1920) and some assumptions concerning Argentina (1870 and
1920), and Uruguay (1870). We find an increasing inequality trend between 1870 and
1920 which can be explained as a process of inequality both within individual countries
and between countries. This trend is discussed along three lines: the relation between
inequality and per capita income levels; the dynamics of the expansion to new areas,
and movements of relative factor prices and of the terms of trade.
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1. Introduction
Latin America is the continent with the highest inequality levels. Economic growth
has not changed the long-run trend. Quite on the contrary, income inequality has
worsened in recent decades.
The origins of Latin American inequality are the subject of debate. While some
scholars have stressed the colonial roots, others have emphasized the role played by the
first globalization boom, or even the Import-Substituting-Industrialization (ISI) period.
Latin America is also a region which has been growing at an average world level, in
a context in which growth rates at world level have been diverging. While Latin
America is not a slow-growth region, no Latin American country has grown rapidly and
well enough to be labeled as a developed country. An obvious question, then, is whether
high inequality levels have been hindering Latin American growth or whether the lack
of fast growth lies behind the relatively high inequality levels in a Kuznets-like
approach.
The main goal of this paper is to provide new estimates of inequality in the Latin
American Southern Cone (LASC) on the eve and at the climax of the first globalization
boom, ca: 1870-1920, and to identify the underlying forces of the estimated inequality
trends. In doing so, we will try to identify the interaction between globalization and
different institutional settings.
2. History and theory
According to a wide range of studies carried out between the 1950s and the 1970s
the roots of Latin American underdevelopment were to be found in the colonial period,
when both a domestic structure of economic concentration and international dependency
relations were responsible for a pattern of development characterized by sluggish
growth and high levels of social and economic inequality (Stein and Stein 1970,
Cardoso & Faletto 1967 & 1979, Cardoso & Perez Brignoli 1979, Furtado 1974, Frank
1967, and many others). These authors usually had a negative view of what we now call
the first globalization boom, as it combined an authoritarian construction of national
states and reinforced the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of an oligarchy
which, in turn, was highly dependent on markets, trading, finance, services and
technology in the hands of foreign companies and states. Generally, these authors were
critical of, but somewhat sympathetic with, the different attempts made by Latin
American countries during the so-called ISI-period to change the basis for economic
growth, promoting structural change, social transformation, improvement in social
conditions, such as education and health, and what would later be labeled as a process
of growth “from within” (Sunkel 1991). According to this tradition, the structural
reforms promoted since the 1970s in most Latin American countries were seen as
containing some good fundamentals, but promoting a development path in line with the
long-run path based on high income and wealth concentration, international
competitiveness based on a perverse pattern of specialization in low-skilled and natural
resource-intensive sectors, and high volatility.
The intellectual atmosphere has shifted during recent decades towards different
approaches which have taken for granted that Latin American backwardness was mainly
a 20th century problem. In particular, the basic idea moved towards the notion that
inward-looking growth, state interventionism, forced and artificial industrialization and
different varieties of populism were the main causes of the disappointing economic and
social outcomes of Latin American development until the 1980s. By going global and
following best practices Latin America should have caught up with developed countries,
as the South-East Asian countries had recently done. Accordingly, what we now call the
first globalization boom appeared as the golden path to development, and deviation
from this path cost Latin America dearly.
During the last decade, the first globalization has been revisited by many scholars
and many of them even reached Latin America. Jeffrey Williamson studied the period
from many different points of view (Williamson 1995, 1999, 2002). His main message
is that Latin America did relatively well during that period and could have done much
better, had Latin America been less protectionist. Latin America also suffered an
increase in inequality, due to the process of factor price convergence, which took place
in line with the Heckscher-Ohlin approach: the price of land increased significantly in
relation to wages, as long as immigration intensified. The terms of trade moved in favor
of Latin America, strengthening the position of landowning classes and inhibiting
structural change in the long run. These latter contributions help to nuance the strong
pro-global points of view of the early 1990s.
Latin American economic history has also been revisited by other scholars. Neo-
institutional economic history has been producing many comparisons between Latin and
North America, in order to unearth the fundamental explanations for long-run growth.
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000), North, Summerhill & Weingast (2000), Landes
(1998), Robinson (2006), Acemouglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002, 2005), have all
agreed with the previous thesis regarding the colonial roots of Latin American
inequality and backwardness. Even though they differ with reference to the origins and
causes of the institutional settings in Latin America, they all stress that the institutional
setting that emerged soon after the conquest is the main explanation for long-run trends.
The major features of these institutions were the concentration of wealth, mercantilism,
religious and cultural intolerance, racism and exclusion, an authoritarian and centralized
state, low human capital formation, limited political democracy and extensive presence
of many kinds of privileges for the elite. Implicit in this line of research is the idea that
what happened in Latin America during the last two centuries followed the path of this
previous period and did not diverge from it. This resembles Braudel’s ideas about the
longue durée. However, long-run jails are no longer cultures, but institutions.
While the idea of the colonial heritage seems to be a plausible one, it does not
necessarily mean that what happened in the following periods was almost a foregone
conclusion. The following periods are being intensively discussed, especially the years
following independence. As many authors have proposed (Prados 2007, Bates,
Coatsworth & Williamson 2006), the way in which the independent states were built
could have a lasting effect on the institutional setting of Latin American countries,
contributing also to an understanding of the post-colonial era in Africa.
Similarly, what took place during the first globalization does not necessarily have to
neglect the “colonial roots”, but this period may certainly provide useful information
towards an understanding of Latin American economic history.
Previous contributions to Latin American economic history all agree on the
profound changes that occurred during the first globalization and on the variety of
transitions in Latin America (Cardoso Faletto 1967, Duncan & Rutledge 1977, Cardoso
& Pérez Brignoli 1979, Sunkel & Paz 1982, Bauer 1986, Glade 1986, Bulmer-Thomas
1994, Bértola & Williamson 2006).
The basic idea is that the opportunities provided by the first globalization promoted
a drastic expansion of the agrarian frontier and radical changes in the distribution of
assets among the population. At the same time, the power of the state was significantly
strengthened, adopting the already mentioned authoritarian shape and content, which
certainly enforced the property rights of the elite. Latin American responses varied
according to previous institutional settings and social structures, and also according to
natural endowments and what has been labeled the commodity lottery. They also varied
according to the different colonial heritages. As a result, Latin America became more
unequal at the climax of the first globalization. In turn, these outcomes constituted
different contexts in which the later process of import substitution took place.
The debate surrounding the role of inequality in growth has been growing. The
literature is already well-known. The discussion on the Kuznets curve, which mainly
focused on the impact of growth on inequality, has given way to the study of the impact
of inequality on growth. From a neo-classical point of view, income inequality affects
the formation of human capital negatively, reduces access to credit and generates
political instability. Inequality has also received attention from other points of view.
Income inequality puts limits on domestic demand, the domestic market does not allow
sophisticated consumption to grow, thus hampering innovation and specializing in
mass-production of low quality goods, the elite develops a limited consumption of
luxuries without any positive impacts on the domestic economy (Willebald 2006).
The present paper concentrates on Latin America’s Southern Cone (LASC). The
reason for selecting this sample is quite simple: these are the countries we understand
best and for which we have best information. The objective is to include more countries
in the future, especially México. However, LASC is a defendable unit of analysis from
different points of view. Geographically, the region includes the temperate areas which
can be considered as an extension of the European frontier. Except for its Southern
provinces and states, Brazil is not well-suited to such criteria. LASC, from another point
of view, includes examples of the three main transitions to capitalism in Latin America,
to be found in many typologies: the slave economies (Brazil); the highlands where pre-
Columbian population was mainly concentrated, becoming the core of the conquest
(Chile could be considered an example, even if it is not a classical case), and the settler
economies, represented by Argentina and Uruguay.
Each country case deserves detailed studies and considerations. The emphasis of
this paper, however, is to try to consider them as a single unit and to extract some
lessons from their common features and from the extent to which their features are
common.
3. Estimating inequality in the Southern Cone
Antecedents
Many efforts have been made during recent decades to increase the availability of
information and the current situation has improved. However, serious problems persist
and each attempt to discuss any economic history topic has to start by making a major
effort to obtain data. This paper is no exception.
Williamson has repeatedly used rental-wage ratios and compared trends in different
groups of countries (land- and labor-abundant; center and periphery, etc.), with quite
interesting results. For the cases of Argentina and Uruguay, the trend during the first
globalization boom is very clear: the rental-wage ratio increases significantly
(Williamson 2002). This pattern is also common to other settler economies, such as
Australia and New Zealand (see Graph 1). One of the shortcomings of these series is
that they show very high changes and variations in terms of real distribution of income
which are difficult to believe. What is more, they probably show the relation between
the extreme components of the distribution, ignoring changes in the middle.
Additionally, the wage data series are based on wages of unskilled workers, thus
excluding improvements in skill premiums. Another shortcoming of Williamson’s
proxies is that they are difficult to aggregate.
Graph 1 about here
Prados (2005) constructed a GDP per worker series to compare with the real wage-
index. This series must be less volatile. Besides, Prados reports nine-year moving
averages. His results also indicate a trend of increasing inequality during the first
globalization boom. This attempt, even though it is also valuable, may be subject to
similar criticisms to those made of Williamson’s. One of them is to compare real wage
data deflated by consumer price indices, with estimates of GDP figures deflated by
GDP deflators or simply estimated through volume estimates. In spite of all such
criticisms, these estimates have been very useful and quite accurate in most cases.
The present paper is strongly inspired by similar concerns as those that inspired
Bourguignon and Morrison (2002). Until some years ago, income distribution was
discussed in two different and relatively independent ways. One strand of research
centered on the convergence-divergence debate, i.e., the inequality trends in average per
capita incomes between countries. Income distribution within countries was thus
neglected. A second strand of research dealt with cross-section studies of country data-
pairs for per capita income and distribution (Gini-coefficients). The aim of these studies
was to establish correlations between levels of per capita income and inequality levels,
most of them trying to find the Kuznets curve. Such studies were concerned with
within-country inequality, and did not take international inequality into account.
B&M attempted to overcome the restrictions of both approaches through the
construction of a world data base for 1820-2000, on the basis of national population,
GDP, and inequality estimates. Using purchasing power parity GDP measures
(Maddison 2001) and national inequality measures, the Gini-coefficients were
transformed into deciles assuming a lognormal distribution. The average income of the
different deciles could later be added to a single database.
The courageous attempt made by B&M faced several problems. The most important
was the lack of historical data for many countries and regions. In order to bridge this
gap, they made some important assumptions. In the case of Latin America, the
assumption made was that inequality had not changed between 1820 and 1950. At first
glance, this assumption looks completely unsustainable and absurd, especially as we
have already shown evidence that income distribution in Latin America really did
change over time. However, this assumption at least makes it possible to take changes
in between-country inequality into consideration, as different countries grew at different
rates both in per capita GDP and in population. An assumed Gini-coefficient “just”
helps to measure the impact of other known components.
The present estimates
The present paper is part of a long-run line of research which aims to construct
databases on income distribution in Latin America for the period 1870-1960, a time-
span for which household surveys are not available. The objective is to work on a
network basis, aiming to incorporate Latin America in world data bases.
Obviously, the underlying purpose is to approach the relation between income
distribution and growth. Thus, after some years of work the present paper presents a
first attempt to estimate income distribution in the Latin American Southern Cone.
Brasil
A detailed presentation of the Brazilian estimate may be found in Bértola, Castelnovo &
Willebald (2008). The estimate uses Brazilian population census figures from 1872 and
1920. Both censuses contain information at province (19 in 1872) and state (21 in 1920)
level, for 48 professions.
The strategy was to assign income to this population.
1872
About 1.5 million of the estimated active population of more than 6 million people were
slaves in 1872. They were assigned an income according to different reports on the cost
of maintenance of slaves. As detailed information on the activity in which the slaves
were involved is available, in cases in which the activity implied a special skill, the
income was increased proportionally to the increase in the price of slaves with this
special qualification. The difference was about 25%.
Obviously there were differences between the incomes of different slaves, women and
men, in the access to land, production for own consumption, etc. Similarly the length of
the working day and in alimentation could vary from place to place. It seems realistic,
however, to assume that differences among slaves did not significantly increase total
inequality in Brazilian society in 1872.
About 5% of the active population consisted of civil servants. Our database includes
official information regarding the income of each and every one of them.
Our third important group of data is the list of voters at municipal level. Unfortunately,
this kind of information is very limited. We have access to complete lists for the state of
Río Grande do Sul (RGS) and processed information for San Pablo (SP) (Klein 1995)
and Río de Janeiro (RJ) (Nunes 2003). Fortunately, the limit of incomes to be declared
in order to obtain the right to vote was extremely low: 200 mil-réis (slaves’ “income”
was estimated to be 64 mil-réis). The register for Rio Grande do Sul, kindly provided by
Leonardo Monasterio, includes more than 3,000 observations, all of which indicate the
profession of the voter, compatible with the census arrangement of professions, and
income.
The available information for the lists for RJ and SP does not allow us to explore the
distribution within each category (as in the case of RGS), but it permits us to compare
the mean with that of RGS. The same distribution as in RGS was assumed in RJ and SP.
Further, Brazil was arranged in five regions: Center-West, North, North-East, South and
South-East. The incomes and distribution of RGS were applied to the South. The
incomes obtained for SP and RJ were applied to the whole SE. In the case of the other
regions, the distribution of RGS was assumed and the average income assigned was the
lowest of the mean income of SP, RJ and RGS for each professional group.
With respect to women, the incomes assigned were 2/3 of similar male income. This
was the average result obtained from many different sources of information. In the cases
of capitalists and owners, and in the case of slaves, the same income as that of males
was assigned.
For some professions and states other data from many different sources was
incorporated with a marginal impact on the total result. As mentioned, the quoted paper
by Bértola, Castelnovo & Willebald (2008) contains the analysis and many
counterfactuals for the Brazilian data base. Here we simply use the crude database,
which is arranged by profession, gender, sector (primary, secondary, tertiary and civil
servants), income, state and region. The data base contains more than 5.3 million
observations, out of an active population slightly above 6 million people.
1920
This estimate is also based on the population census. We have assigned income to 8.1
million people out of an active population of 18 million. While we have already
produced four generations of databases for 1872, this is only the second one for 1920.
The main sources for income are as follows.
- A list of 32,000 civil servants (out of 186,000) with detailed information on
income and profession.
- A survey of wages in the secondary sector with the number of workers by 21
income intervals (8 male adult, 5 female adult, 4 male 14-20, 4 female 14-20),
for 14 branches and 21 states. The survey covers about 1/5 of the total
population registered by the census in these activities.
- Information on average wages for 10 categories of primary workers at state level
(21).
- An estimate of the income of landowners according to census data on the size of
farms and wage-ratios for 1920 and regional productivity differences for 1940.
- An estimate of industrial capitalists’ incomes, using the industrial survey from
1920, and assuming the existence of one owner per enterprise.
If we expand our database to the whole of the active population according to the
census and using our average income, we obtain a total income of 17.3 billion mil-
reis, compared to 14.9 billion estimated by Goldsmith (1986, p. 147, Table IV-2).
Chile
Detailed information on how the Chilean estimates were constructed can be found in
Rodríguez (2007). The changing structure of the active population by sector of activity
(agriculture, mining, manufactures, buildings, transport and communications,
commerce, and others) was taken from Braun et. al (2000, tables, 7.1-2). These large
sectors include several professions each. The weight of each profession within each
sector was taken from the 1907 census. Additional disaggregation was carried out for
some professions, such as the agrarian sector and mining. On the contrary, other
professions were joined into fewer groups.
With respect to income, several different sources were used and made comparable for
both years. When prices or incomes were not directly available, factor price series were
applied to existing data in order to complete the information for both years. In other
cases, the values are the result of interpolation between other available years.
Uruguay
1870
In the case of Uruguay we do not have our own inequality estimate for 1870. In Section
4 we will discuss the so-called Inequality Possibility Frontier as proposed by Lindert,
Milanovic & Williamson (2007). According to the value obtained for Uruguay in 1920,
and assuming a subsistence income of 400 international 1990 dollars, we obtained a
figure to be used to help assign weight to other Uruguayan variables such as per capita
GDP and population, by estimating a polynomial regression (third order).
1920
The 1920 inequality estimate is provided by Bértola (2005) and takes into consideration
an exhaustive series of civil servants, 8 income categories for industrial workers in 8
different industrial branches and the whole agrarian sector, including owners and
tenants according to the size of farms, and wage earners. The data base covers about
70% of the active population.
Argentina
Unfortunately it has not yet been possible to make much progress in the estimation of
Argentine incomes. In order not to exclude the important role played by Argentina in
the region with respect to per capita GDP growth and population growth, we have
decided to make some reasonable assumptions regarding inequality in Argentina.
1870
For 1870, a similar procedure to that used in the case of Uruguay was followed.
Argentina is a larger and more diverse country than Uruguay. In order not to ignore
valuable information regarding differences in regional per capita GDP in Argentina, we
applied the Gini-coefficient obtained to any single province. Total inequality will be the
result of similar within-province inequalities but some between-province inequality.
One further problem for 1870, was the fact that differences in provincial per capita GDP
were assumed to be the same as in 1920, following Llach (2004). Provincial per capita
GDP figures provided by this author for earlier periods looked less reliable.
1920
The Uruguayan 1920 Gini-coefficient was applied to each Argentine province for which
reliable per capita GDP estimates are available. See Llach (2004).
Southern Cone
The estimate of total inequality in the Southern Cone was obtained in the following
way:
- The estimated or assigned country Gini-coefficients are transformed into deciles
assuming a normal distribution.
- The average per capita income of each decile of each country is estimated using
the purchasing power parity per capita GDP, according to Maddison (2001).
- Thus, each year´s (1870 and 1920) estimate is the result of a database of 40
observations (10 country deciles and 4 countries; see Appendix Table 1).
This data base will allow us to see how much total inequality increased in the region as
an aggregate of the changes produced within each country and between the four
countries. This latter change derives from both changes in GDP levels and population.
When reading the results on changes in within-country inequality we have to keep in
mind that the 1870 and 1920 Argentine absolute inequality level for each province was
assumed, as well as that of Uruguay in 1870. As will be discussed, the results are
consistent with other proxies and we consider we have made a moderate assumption
regarding the inequality increase in Argentina and Uruguay.
3. Growth and Inequality
Growth
The first globalization boom was characterized by very rapid economic expansion in
new areas. GDP growth in LASC and in the USA was 70% higher than the world
average and six times higher than that of the 12 leading Western-European countries.
GDP growth in the USA was slightly above that of LASC.
Population grew faster in the LASC than in the USA, due to the well-known fact that
Latin European emigration took place later than North-European (Hatton & Williamson
1994) and due to the “delayed” Latin American growth (Halperin 1985, 1999).
Per capita GDP growth in the USA was 20% higher than that of LASC. However, the
growth rate of the latter was remarkable: 40% higher than that of the Western-European
countries (see Table 1).1
Table 1 about here
Within LASC, several differences can be observed. Argentina stands out, growing faster
than the others in all respects. Brazil and Uruguay experienced rapid population growth,
but per capita GDP did not rise much. The population of Chile did not grow much, but a
higher per capita GDP compensated for this.
As a result, an important shift occurred between 1870 and 1920 mainly in the Argentine
and Brazilian shares of total income: while the first doubled, the latter was reduced to
almost half of previous values. What is more, Argentine income surpassed that of
Brazil, which had almost tripled the Argentine level in 1870. The mean income of
Argentina reached almost 4 times that of Brazil in 1920. Chile and Uruguay also had
much higher mean incomes than Brazil.
Table 2 about here
Inequality
As shown in Table 3, all the measures reported indicate that inequality grew
significantly in the Southern Cone during the first globalization boom. All the so-called
Kuznets-coefficients report a coherent picture of increasing inequality. In all cases the
relations between the income shares of a poorer group of the population and a richer
one, show a reduction of the relation in detriment of the poorer. The General Entropy
Indices, as well as the Gini, tell the same story. What is more, the changes are so huge
that many modifications would have to be introduced in the data to obtain a different
picture.
Table 3 about here
According to Table 4, distribution of income in all the countries worsened. The clearest
cases are those of Brazil and Chile, as our estimates for these countries cover both
periods of time. The increasing inequality in Argentina and Uruguay are not surprising,
as the values were assigned (except for Uruguay 1920). In our defence we can argue
that all the other available inequality proxies confirm the existence of a negative trend
(see next section). In the case of Argentina we can also argue that we are
underestimating the differences arising from uneven per capita GDP growth in different
provinces. By keeping relative per capita GDP at province level constant, we are only
capturing inequality differences arising from uneven population growth, but not from
uneven per capita GDP growth. Much evidence points to the fact that Buenos Aires and
the provinces of the Pampa Gringa (especially Santa Fe and Córdoba) as well as
Mendoza and Tucumán, could have grown at faster rates than other backward regions.
Table 4 also shows results concerning that part of inequality that can be explained by
within-country changes, and the part arising from changes in inequality between
countries. The latter is a more reliable indicator and also shows a significant increase.
This could be expected from the different rates at which different countries grew, but
the final outcome is not obvious.
Table 4 about here
The low inequality level of Brazil in 1872 is a very surprising result. This is the fourth
database that our team has produced. Each new version attempted to increase the variety
of data by regions, professions, etc, with the idea that important information had not
1 For 1870-1913, the growth rates of the per capita GDP of Latin America and Europe were 1.8 and 1.3
respectively.
been included. Much work remains, especially regarding the estimation of the income of
the elite, but it is striking that all the results obtained until now have fluctuated between
a Gini-coefficient of 38 and 40. Is this a realistic result? This topic will be tackled in
next section.
4. Inequality and per capita GDP level
The low inequality levels obtained for Brazil in 1872 were very surprising, as Brazil is
nowadays one of the most unequal societies in the world. A slave society in 1872 could
also be expected to show an extremely unfair distribution of income. This paradox
suggested several avenues of research. As already mentioned, one such line was to find
better data, especially with reference to regional inequality. Secondly, if the low
inequality levels of 1872 were confirmed, we wondered how they could be explained.
Thirdly, we needed to be able to identify when and why inequality grew to the high
levels reached since the 1950s.
As mentioned, all our efforts to “raise” the Gini resulted in failure which meant that we
had to pursue the second line of research. We found an interesting framework in
Lindert, Milanovic & Williamson (2007). Their basic idea is that the level of possible
inequality, the inequality possibility frontier (IPF), in their words, depends on the level
of per capita income, the subsistence level for the majority of the population and the
size of the elite that can appropriate the eventual surplus. They present a final equation
as follows:
G* = ((– 1)/) (1-),
where G* is the IPF for a certain level of per capita income, εis the proportion of
people belonging to a very small upper class and is the relation between average
income and the subsistence income. In other words, an economy at a very low level of
development, where average income is not much higher than subsistence level, does not
produce a surplus large enough to allow for high inequality levels.
The authors present a theoretical IPF-curve, assuming that the elite is 0.1% of the
population and that subsistence income is 300 or 400 international purchasing power
parity dollars (the latter figure is used by Maddison as an historical benchmark).
Their results are plotted in Figure 1, together with ours.
Figure 1 about here
In Appendix Table 2 we present two panels with the comparison between our estimates
and the theoretical results of applying equation (1) to our data.
If we introduce Brazil’s mean income to LMW’s equation, we obtain a very good fit of
our estimate to the curve, showing that Brazil was, both in 1872 and in 1920 (Panel A),
almost on the IPF-curve: the Brazilian elites were extracting from the working
population all potential surplus.
However, the situation is not so simple. The fact that the subsistence level obtained for
Brazil is much lower than the one estimated by Maddison and used by LMW represents
a serious problem. Our 1990 PPP$153 for 1872 (the income of the first decile) is half
the downward correction introduced by LMW as an Asian PPP. When using our real
subsistence income values in Panel B, the available surplus increases significantly and
the IPF rises to 79. Our estimate is half of that value. How can this be explained?
One possibility follows the line taken by previous studies of the American abolition of
slavery. As long as slaves are capital to take care of, the “income” of slaves is later
shown to be higher than the real subsistence income or the income available in post-
slave economies, with an important supply of unqualified labour. The reduction we
obtain in the income of the first decile between 1872, even if hardly acceptable, points
in this direction. Thus, the low inequality level in 1872 could be partially explained as
the combination of a low per capita income and the interest of slave-owners of keeping
their investment in slaves in good shape.
A second possible explanation is that the Brazilian (and other LASC countries) per
capita GDP series are wrong. If this is correct, per capita GDP did grow less than
estimated. This has nothing to do with our direct inequality estimates, which are
performed at current domestic prices. This question will be addressed in our future
research.
In short, even though many compatibility problems between our inequality estimates
and Maddison’s long-run series remain, the low inequality measures obtained for Brazil
in 1872 cannot be disregarded as being unrealistic.
On the other hand, the LMW approach appears to be an interesting one in the discussion
regarding the relation between real and potential inequality and thus the role of different
institutional arrangements and structural features.
5. Inequality and globalization
Globalization
Globalization can be defined as a process of declining spread between commodity and
factor prices at different points of a market. The underlying forces can be the reduction
of tariffs and other barriers to the mobility of factors and goods and the reduction of
transport and other transaction costs.
The first globalization boom was mainly driven by technological and organizational
changes in the transport sector, both maritime and land. The reduction of real freight
prices was impressive: the North freight rate index for American export routes (North
1958) dropped by more than 41 percent in real terms between 1870 and 1910, while the
British index fell by about 70 percent between 1840 and 1910 (Bértola & Williamson
2006).
However, in the case of LASC, the impact was somewhat lower: average freight costs
between Montevideo and Liverpool fell annually by 0.7 percent between 1870 and 1913
(Bértola 2000: Table 4.1, p. 102). Juan Stemmer, however, has shown (1989: p. 24),
that overseas freight rates fell much less in the case of the southward leg than in that of
the northward leg. This means that bulky South American exports benefited more from
freight reductions than more valuable imports per unit of weight.
Even railroads made their contribution to the reduction of economic distances. In the
case of the small Uruguayan territory, railroad tariffs decreased by 3.1 annually between
the 1870s and 1913 (Bértola 2000: Table 4.1, p. 102). This fall in prices has to be added
to the relative cost reduction between railroads and traditional means of transport.
Expansion of the frontier and inequality
The immediate consequence of these transport price reductions was the improvement in
the competitiveness of Latin American production on the basis of the exploitation of
natural resources. As the world became smaller in economic terms, new areas could
compete at an advantage, meeting an increasing demand on world markets, driven by
rapid per capita income growth and industrialization in Europe. Besides, the fast
domestic growth of the USA was consuming an increasing share of America’s agrarian
surplus.
The impact of these freight price changes on the productive front can be approached
with the help of Figure 2. Different economic activities are arranged according to the
relative productivity in the center and in the periphery. Transport costs determine the
width of the range (Zx-Zm) within which goods are not tradable, as transport costs
outweigh differences in productivity. As freight costs are reduced, trade is created, thus
increasing the range of tradable activities in both the South and the North. The creation
of employment, of course, will depend on the features of the export sectors.
Figure 2 about here
Accordingly, the agrarian frontier advanced at high rates, mainly on the Atlantic coast
of LASC. In the case of Argentina, a country with an extensive open frontier, the land-
labor index moved from 29 to 100 between 1883 and 1911 (Williamson 2002,
Appendix Table 3) in spite of very rapid population growth, implying an increase in the
number of hectares per worker. The same situation affected Brazil, where the leading
region was the South East, which experienced its own “conquest of the West” and
South. The smaller Uruguay, on the contrary, without an open frontier to occupy, saw
how the land-labor ratio was reduced by half during the same period, implying that the
territory had twice as many people per hectare in 1911 as in 1883. A similar trend can
be found in the core of the Buenos Aires region.
Chile was not an exception and expanded its frontier both towards the South and the
North, especially after the War of the Pacific. The Northern region was rich in nitrates,
copper and guano. Besides, the Panama Channel should have a great impact in transport
costs with the Atlantic. This impact, however, should be more important after the period
we are dealing with.
The expansion of the frontier implied major changes in the distribution of the
population in the territory and subsequently in the distribution of income, depending on
the relative per capita income of each region. The Argentine Pampas grew very rapidly
in relation to the less dynamic inland. The population of the Pampa Gringa and Buenos
Aires increased from 60 to 80% of the total population.
In Brazil, as shown in Table 5, regional inequality grew three-fold between 1872 and
1920. The stagnating and poor North-East lost ground to the dynamic South and South-
East, in terms of both population share and average per capita income. The income
share of the South and South-East increased from 41 to 67%.
Table 5 about here
Finally, considering the LASC as a whole, between-country inequality increased more
than three-fold, as shown in Table 4. This analysis will be enriched when more reliable
information is available for the different Argentine regions. It will then be possible to
study the LASC as the sum of about 12-14 regional economies instead of 4 countries.
Regional inequality depends also on the so-called commodity lottery. Economic growth
was strongly dependent on the availability of natural resources. Moreover, economic
growth depended on how demand, prices and international competition changed in these
different commodity markets. In Bértola & Williamson (2006) these features were
analyzed from the point of view of the international commodity markets and the
dominant labor markets in these commodity markets. The Argentine Pampas, Uruguay
and Southern Brazil produced similar commodities to those produced in core countries
by high income peasants, who set a high marginal price for their products, also due to
the high price of land. Countries producing tropical crops in competition with labor
abundant economies could hardly be competitive if paying high wages, unless some
kind of monopolistic position was taken, as in the case of the coffee plantations in
Brazil. The production of minerals used to be highly concentrated in space and faced
varying degrees of market competition. The commodity lottery was thus favorable for
temperate regions such as those of the Río de la Plata, for the almost monopolistic
coffee production in Brazil and for the Chilean nitrates. However, the rubber plantations
of Northern Brazil, for example, faced drastic changes in international competitiveness,
first challenged by Indonesian production and later by synthetic rubber.
Globalization and relative factor prices
The Brazilian and Chilean cases point to the fact that inequality also increased within
each country. As shown in Table 5, inequality also grew within each single Brazilian
region.
One important economic force can make an important contribution to the understanding
of within-region inequality: relative factor price movements. The previously mentioned
inequality estimates for Latin America during the first globalization (Williamson 2002,
Prados 2005, Bértola 2005) were based on the estimation of these variables.
The Heckscher-Ohlin model predicts an increase in the relative price of natural
resources, the abundant factor, in relation to wages. Graph 1 shows how important these
relative price movements were in different economies of new settlement.
The impact of these price movements on inequality is not obvious and depends on
several social and institutional factors. If land is highly concentrated and labour demand
is relatively scarce, inequality will probably rise more than if land-concentration is
relatively low, immigrants have access to land and relative labor supply is low. This
contrast has been exemplified by Adelman (1994) who compared the Pampas and
Canada. Political institutions play a very significant role, as they define policy of access
to land, the control of labor, etc. Recently, Alvarez (2007) has shown how the
distribution of wealth (land, in this case) in New Zealand and Uruguay had a huge
impact on the functional distribution of income. While in New Zealand the state owned
an important share of the land and had an important impact on the level of land rents, in
Uruguay the state was completely absent. This different distribution of wealth led to a
quite different distribution of income between wages, profits and land rents. In the
institutional framework of a slave economy, wages are doomed to remain close to
subsistence minimum, but post-slave societies may face even worse conditions in a
context of a large labor surplus, racial discrimination and authoritarian regimes.
Terms of trade and inequality
The first globalization boom was followed by a positive terms of trade shock for most
Latin American countries. Improved terms of trade were the result of many different
forces. The first, and probably the most important one, was the previously mentioned
reduction of transport costs. This particular force has the peculiarity that it may have
produced the same impact on both sides of the Atlantic economy. This is because export
prices are usually recorded at FOB prices, while import prices are CIF prices, thus
registering the contraction of freight costs (Coatsworth & Williamson 2002).
According to Graph 2, terms of trade in both Latin America improved. So they did in
Europe (Williamson 2002). An expected result is, however, that the terms of trade
improvement trend will disappear in relation to the exhaustion of the effect of the
revolution of transports. What is more, this seems to have coincided with the critical
situation during WWI, when freight prices increased considerably.
Graph 2 about here
Terms of trade are also extremely volatile, depending on the demand for and prices of
particular commodities. As the Latin American countries were highly dependent on a
few natural resources, changing terms of trade had a huge impact on relative domestic
prices.
The impact of terms of trade on income distribution is also highly dependent on the
structure of exports, on social and institutional factors, as well as on the per capita
income of the population.
Given the agrarian origin of LASC exports, there tends to be a direct correlation
between terms of trade and relative factor prices, as shown in Graph 3.
Graph 3 about here
A particular case is the Chilean one during the age of the nitrates. As export incomes
were highly concentrated in foreign enterprises, the improved terms of trade did not
have a huge impact on domestic inequality. However, when considering the functional
distribution of income between wages and profits, the impact on inequality is clearly
noticeable (Rodríguez 2007, Graph 11).
In the case of Brazil, the terms of trade did not improve, or even worsened. However,
the construction of regional export price indices may reveal the existence of important
differences.
Summary of findings and agenda for future research
This paper presents a first generation of direct estimates of income inequality in the
LASC countries. The evidence presented is of varied quality, including relatively good
estimates for Brazil, Chile and, in part, for Uruguay, combined with some assumptions
regarding Gini-coefficients for Argentina, 1870 and 1920 and Uruguay, 1870.
The results may have underestimated inequality increases in Argentina, as only
changes in the distribution of population among its provinces were taken into
consideration.
The picture obtained is that of an important increase in LASC inequality between
1870 and 1920. This increase is the result of many different, but reinforcing forces:
1. Population increased at different rates and grew more in countries and regions
with higher average per capita income.
2. Per capita income grew at different rates in different countries and regions.
Highly populated and relatively high-income Argentina grew faster than
populous Brazil. Relatively high-income regions in Brazil grew faster than poor
ones.
3. The combination of these first two factors resulted in a three-fold increase in
between-country inequality.
4. Within-country inequality grew in Brazil and Chile, and probably in Argentina
and Uruguay too, as also suggested by complementary proxies for income
inequality, such as land-labour ratios, per capita GDP-real wage ratios and terms
of trade. Moreover, a major increase in inequality is also noticeable at the
within-region level. This situation was experienced by every Brazilian region.
The objective of this paper is not to present detailed national or regional studies, but to
concentrate on the global view. Some lines of interpretation of the trends discovered are
as follows:
1. Globalization implied a drastic reduction of transport prices and introduced
changes in the set of tradable goods in the Atlantic economy. Changes in relative
productivity favored a dramatic expansion of the frontier and an increasing
demand for labor. While “old” areas saw how the land-labour ratios diminished,
others, like the Argentine West, experienced an important increase in this ratio.
As an outcome, high-income, export-led regions increased their shares in total
population and total income, producing increases in between country and
between-region inequality. What is more, countries and regions producing
commodities similar to those produced in the core countries were able to achieve
higher levels of per capita income, as the prices of their commodities were set by
the production in high-income European countries, with high land prices.
2. Within-country and especially within-region inequality were also fueled by
relative factor price movements. Prices moved a la Heckscher-Ohlin resulting
from factor movements across the Atlantic, making the price of land, the
abundant factor, rise and that of labor, fall in relative terms. There is sound
evidence in this area. The special way in which these price movements impact
on the distribution of income depends on the distribution of assets. The highly
concentrated pattern of landownership, compared to other settler societies,
makes it possible to conclude that the impact of this factor was important.
3. The paper leaves the field open for more detailed institutional studies on factors
which make it possible to explain the difference between the Inequality
Possibility Frontier and the real inequality in different countries and regions.
Differences arising from quite different institutional settings, such as the
transition from a slave to a free labor economy, or the expansion towards the
frontier on the basis of immigrant labor, leave ample space for the debate on the
role of institutions and inequality for growth. Further contributions within the
framework of the present project will tackle these issues.
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Figure 2. Productivity gaps and transport costs
Table 1. Population, GDP and Per capita GDP Growth of the Southern Cone, USA, Western Europe and the World,
1870 and 1920.
Argentina Brazil Chile Uruguay SC USA W. Europe 12 World
Population (1000)
1870 1,796 9,797 1,945 343 13,881 40,241 162,386 1,271,915
1920 8,861 27,404 3,723 1,371 41,359 106,881 223,731 1,791,323
Growth % 493 280 191 400 298 266 138
annual rate 3.2 2.1 1.3 2.8 2.2 2.0 0.6 0.8
GDP
(1990 Geary-Khamis dollars)
1870 2,354 6,985 2,509 748 12,596 98,374 339,103 1,112,655
1920 30,775 26,393 10,305 3,666 71,139 593,438 739,408 2,732,131
Growth % 1,307 378 411 490 565 603 218
annual rate 5.3 2.7 2.9 3.2 3.5 3.7 1.6 2.1
Per capita GDP
(1990 Geary-Khamis dollars)
1870 1,311 713 1,290 2,181 907 2,445 2,088 875
1920 3,473 963 2,768 2,674 1,720 5,552 3,305 1,525
Growth % 265 135 215 123 190 227 158
annual rate 2.0 0.6 1.5 0.4 1.3 1.7 0.9 1.3
Maddison, A. (2003).
World: 1913 instead of 1920.
Table 2. The distribution of population and income among the SC countries, 1870 and 1920.
Pop share Mean Income* Rel.mean Income Share log(mean)
1870
Ar 0.13 1,311 1.44 0.19 7.18
Br 0.71 713 0.79 0.55 6.57
Ch 0.14 1,290 1.42 0.20 7.16
Uy 0.02 2,181 2.40 0.06 7.69
1920
Ar 0.21 3,473 2.02 0.43 8.15
Br 0.66 963 0.56 0.37 6.87
Ch 0.09 2,768 1.61 0.14 7.93
Uy 0.03 2,674 1.55 0.05 7.89
* 1990 Geary-Khamis intenational dollars.
Table 3. Distribution measures for the Southern Cone, 1870 and 1920.
p90/p10 p90/p50 p10/p50 p75/p25
1870 12.183 3.533 0.290 3.002
1920 36.516 6.324 0.173 5.860
GE(0) GE(1) Gini
1870 0.415 0.439 0.486
1920 0.897 0.821 0.653
Table 4. Inequality indices of the SC, 1872 and 1920: by country, within-countries and between-countries.
Country indices
GE(0) GE(1) Gini
1870 0.363 0.382 0.052 0.057
Ar 0.513 0.477 0.522
Br 0.264 0.255 0.392
Ch 0.715 0.643 0.594
Uy 0.421 0.397 0.481
1920 0.721 0.640 0.176 0.180
Ar 0.654 0.595 0.574
Br 0.725 0.651 0.597
Ch 0.886 0.776 0.641
Uy 0.618 0.565 0.562
Within-country Between-country
Table 5. Brazilian inequality, 1872 and 1920.
1872 1920 1872 1920 1872 1920 1872 1920
Center -West 2.7 2.7 3.0 3.1 276 3,179 1.13 1.20
North 3.5 5.3 3.9 4.2 291 2,084 1.11 0.79
North-East 48.5 37.4 52.1 25.7 287 1,817 1.07 0.68
South 7.7 11.2 9.9 16.3 331 3,824 1.28 1.44
South-East 37.5 43.4 31.1 50.7 213 3,092 0.83 1.16
Region GE(0) GE(1) Gini
1872
Center -West 0.258 0.287 0.389
North 0.264 0.303 0.394
North-East 0.225 0.254 0.360
South 0.240 0.269 0.372
South-East 0.337 0.393 0.441
1920
Center -West 0.701 1.067 0.624
North 0.516 0.808 0.545
North-East 0.637 1.027 0.595
South 0.627 0.958 0.595
South-East 0.617 0.891 0.593
Within-region
1872 0.271 0.301
1920 0.623 0.939
Between-region
1872 0.011 0.011
1920 0.039 0.038
Pop. Share Income Share Mean Income (mil-rèis) Relative mean
Appendix Table 1. Per capita GDP by deciles in the Southern Cone
countries, 1870 and 1920 (1990 Geary-Khamis dollars).
Country Nber Income Nber Income
Argentina 179600 237 886100 248
Argentina 179600 405 886100 523
Argentina 179600 545 886100 799
Argentina 179600 689 886100 1121
Argentina 179600 852 886100 1519
Argentina 179600 1045 886100 2039
Argentina 179600 1292 886100 2767
Argentina 179600 1638 886100 3893
Argentina 179600 2213 886100 6012
Argentina 179600 4189 886100 15811
Brazil 979700 153 2740400 58
Brazil 979700 250 2740400 126
Brazil 979700 328 2740400 198
Brazil 979700 407 2740400 282
Brazil 979700 494 2740400 389
Brazil 979700 595 2740400 530
Brazil 979700 722 2740400 730
Brazil 979700 897 2740400 1046
Brazil 979700 1181 2740400 1653
Brazil 979700 2103 2740400 4619
Chile 194457 79 372260 114
Chile 194457 173 372260 269
Chile 194457 269 372260 440
Chile 194457 383 372260 652
Chile 194457 526 372260 929
Chile 194457 716 372260 1308
Chile 194457 985 372260 1866
Chile 194457 1408 372260 2778
Chile 194457 2218 372260 4612
Chile 194457 6145 372260 14715
Uruguay 34300 556 137100 209
Uruguay 34300 869 137100 432
Uruguay 34300 1109 137100 653
Uruguay 34300 1347 137100 907
Uruguay 34300 1604 137100 1219
Uruguay 34300 1898 137100 1623
Uruguay 34300 2261 137100 2183
Uruguay 34300 2748 137100 3043
Uruguay 34300 3520 137100 4643
Uruguay 34300 5895 137100 11828
1870 1920
Appendix Table 2: Estimated Gini-coefficients and the Inequality Possibility Frontier for the Southern Cone
countries, 1870 and 1920.
Panel A: elite as 0,1% of the population and subsistence income at $400 1990-PPP.
%G-real/IPF G-real IPF % élite mean subsistence
income
a e m s
Argentina 1872 0.75 0.52 0.69 3.28 0.1% 1311 400
1920 0.65 0.57 0.88 8.68 0.1% 3473 400
Brasil 1872 0.88 0.39 0.44 1.80 0.1% 721 400
1920 1.02 0.60 0.58 2.41 0.1% 963 400
Chile 1870 0.86 0.59 0.69 3.23 0.1% 1290 400
1920 0.75 0.64 0.85 6.92 0.1% 2768 400
Uruguay 1872 0.59 0.48 0.82 5.45 0.1% 2181 400
1920 0.66 0.56 0.85 6.68 0.1% 2674 400
Averages
1872 0.75
1920 0.75
total 0.77
Panel B: own estimate of subsistence income (1990-PPP).
% élite mean subsistence
income
G-real G a e m s
Argentina 1872 0.64 0.52 0.82 5.52 0.1% 1311 237
1920 0.62 0.57 0.93 14.03 0.1% 3473 248
Brasil 1872 0.50 0.39 0.79 4.71 0.1% 721 153
1920 0.64 0.60 0.94 16.65 0.1% 963 58
Chile 1870 0.63 0.59 0.94 16.27 0.1% 1290 79
1920 0.67 0.64 0.96 24.29 0.1% 2768 114
Uruguay 1872 0.65 0.48 0.74 3.92 0.1% 2181 556
1920 0.61 0.56 0.92 12.82 0.1% 2674 209
Averages
1872 0.60
1920 0.63
total 0.62
